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In China, the academic independent directors are the most important groups of 
independent directors, accounted for 40% proportion of independent directors. The 
effectiveness of academic independent directors’ functions and their ability to improve 
firm value, are directly related to the success of independent directors system. But so 
far, there are few studies specialized on academic independent directors. Most studies 
interpreted ‘academy’ as a kind of background without further studying. According to 
two policies announced by The Central Organization Department of The CPC and The 
Ministry of Education, we examine the relationship between academic independent 
directors and firm value. Our study provides strong evidence that firm’s cumula t ive 
abnormal return is significantly negative when academic independent directors resign 
from the listed companies, which implies that academics as outside directors are 
valuable for firms. Subsequently, we analyze the channels between academic 
independent directors and firm value. On the one hand, in the area where intermed iary 
organizations are less developed, academic independent directors’ resignation will 
decrease the firm value greatly, which means academic independent directors can play 
advising role and their professional knowledge are more valuable for those firms. On 
the other hand, we compare the corporate governance before and after independent 
directors’ being position. We observe that academics as outside directors can reduce the 
self-interest behavior of management and play a positive role in corporate governance. 
However other independent directors have few connections with corporate governance. 
Finally, we also study the major background of academic independent directors. We 
also find that major is an important factor that influence the relationship between 
academic independent directors and firm value. The resignation of academic 
independent directors with accounting, law or general background will decrease the 
firm value significantly, but not with technology background.  
Our study make contributions to the existing literature of independent directors. 
According to two policies, we use event study methodology to examine the relationship 
between academic independent directors and firm value, which reduces the endogenous 
problems and provides strong evidence to support the positive role of academic 
independent directors in improving firm value. Our conclusion also shed lights on the 
channels through which academic independent directors influence firm value, which 















implementation of related policies 
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这一外生政策引起的独立董事“离职潮”，通过手工搜集 A 股上市公司 2013 年
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